Chinese Association for International Understanding

The so-called “major consensus” refers to the tacit understanding and agreement between the two countries on a series of fundamental strategic issues. These fundamental strategic issues include which kind of country they expect their own to become, what means they would adopt in order to realize their national objectives, which kind of country they expect the other side to become, how they deal with bilateral relations.

It was flat 70 years from the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC held in the end of 1978 to 2049—the deadline of the realization of the latter of the “two centenary goals”. The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the CPC held in the end of 2013 happened to divide the 70 years into two 35 years. In the first 35 years, China witnessed dramatic changes and we are now facing the historical mission of comprehensively deepening the reform during the second 35 years.

In the past 35 years, the core of the American diplomatic strategy to China was “contact”. The United States strove to pull China into the international system dominated by itself via close contact with China in various fields such as politics, economy, military and social affairs. On the one hand, such a strategy was beneficial for the realization of the strategic and economic interest of the United States; on the other hand, the United States tried to shape the development of China: the implementation of market economy, the gradual adoption of western democratic system and the support of the “leader status” of the United States in international affairs. In a word, the United States hoped China be more similar with it and become more pro-America.

In this period, the Chinese diplomatic strategy to the United States can be summarized as “assimilation”: by integrating into the western- dominated international system to realize its modernization. China joined the major international mechanisms, accepted the major international rules, and the economy and society of China well integrated with the rest of the world. However, while integrating with the outside world, the Chinese government adhered to the principles of “keep the initiative in own hands” and “Four Fundamental Principles”—keeping highly altered to the various risks and issues of opening to the outside world.

To be brief, since 1978, China has worked to “integrate into” and the United States has strove to “pull in”. Therefore, on the issue of the integration of China into the international system, a “major consensus” gradually formed between the United States and China. Although “integrate into” and “pull in” were not the ultimate objectives of both countries and there were deep divisions over the issue that the United States hoped to shape China and China was determined to stick to its characteristics. However, before China finishes its mission of integrating into the international system, the divergence between China and the United States over the ultimate goal was not imminent. The existence of the “major consensus” aided both countries in going through a series of difficult periods, such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the bombing of the Embassy of China in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the South China Sea collision incident in 2001. Although some of these crisis were of high intensity, thanks to the existence of the “major consensus”, both countries could confine themselves merely to facts as they were and refrained from questioning the fundamental strategic intention and strategic trend of each other. China wouldn’t, for the reason of a certain crisis, feel it should not continue to “integrate into” the international system or the United States no longer wanted to “pull” it into the international system. The United States wouldn’t, for the reason of a certain crisis, argue that China would no longer hope to “integrate into” the international system or it should not try to “pull” China into the international system.

Since it joined the WTO in 2001, China’s historical mission of integrating into the international system was almost completed. During this process, China realized rapid growing while maintaining its own political system and development model. At the same time, the existing “major consensus” was gradually loosening and the contradiction on eventual objectives (namely, the United States hopes to shape the development of China while China hopes to stick to its own characteristics) between the two countries was becoming more and more prominent.

In 2005, the then US Secretary of State Robert Zoelick pointed out in his speech “responsible stakeholder” that the US diplomatic strategy to China should go beyond “contact”. During the past 10 years, more and more people in the United States argued that the premise hypothesis of “contact” was false-because China would not change itself with its “contact” with the United States. People of the United States complained that China had remained unchanged in terms of politics, the role of the government was still prominent in terms of economic affairs, and the position of the country became more and more tough in terms of diplomacy. Many people in the United States felt that they’ve suffered a loss in the process of “puling” China into the international system. From this perspective, we can argue that the debate on the diplomatic strategy to China in the United States since this spring was just the continuation and strengthening of this process.

The loosening of strategic consensus was not caused solely by one side. During the past more than ten years, under the circumstance of the left-leaning of the overall spectrum of the Chinese intellectual circle, with the stimulation of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the bombing of the Embassy of China in Yugoslavia, the South China Sea collision incident and the Olympic Torch Relay disruption, the attitude of the Chinese people on all walks of life to the United States has undergone great changes. The mood of “say no” or “feel unhappy” in the intellectual circle and ordinary people has strengthened; books such as “Currency War” “Energy War” and “Food War” became best sellers; doubt and worry in the Chinese society on the perspective of future peaceful development in the existing international system have increased. In the circles of people working in the fields of international studies and international news report, the concept and awareness of “de-Americanize” were widely discussed and accepted, showing that the United States was gradually moving from the central position of being followed and imitated to a position more equal and “ordinary”.

Trade and economic relations were often referred to as the ballast of Sino-US relations. However, the author argues that only a “major consensus” accepted and truly believed by the leaders and people of both countries can serve as the real “ballast” of Sino-US relations. Due to the loosening of the “major consensus”, the divergences and contradictions on some concrete issues are prone to cause doubt on the overall strategic intention of each other. Therefore, although there was no high intensity crisis such as plane crash or bombing of embassy between the two countries during the past ten years, the competitiveness and antagonism of Sino-US relations have rised apparently.

The nature of contemporary international relations determined that military conflicts or cold war style comprehensive confrontation was very unlikely to occur between the United States and China. However, if the trend of recent years continues, we could not completely rule out the possibility of a “new cold war” between the two countries. It was just like the US-Russian relations today-the two countries being seriously conflicted and opposite in terms of national strategy while by and large maintained normal relations in areas such as trade, economy and society. Once the “new cold war” between China and the United States occurred, the diplomatic strategy of the United States to China would be likely to convert from “contact first, lookout second” to “lookout first, cooperation second”. The diplomatic strategy of China to the United States will convert correspondingly from “integrate first, precaution second” to “balance the influence of the United States first, cooperation second”. This is the reason why some American scholars say that the Sino-US relations have reached a “critical point” or “strategic crossroads”. Although the author argued that the proposal of such argument was too early and too pessimistic, we could not deny that the Sino-US relations were moving towards such a negative direction during the past two or three years.

From an objective perspective, the time and space background of Sino-US relations has undergone dramatic changes compared with 35 years ago. The scale of Chinese economy has surged from 12% percent of that of the United States 15 years ago to now about 60% of the scale of the United States, and it is very likely to surpass the scale of the economy of the United States in next ten years. China has not only integrated with the international system, but also proposed a series of new concepts and ideas in the past two years, such as the Asian security concept, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, thus converting from a follower to one of the active leaders of the international system.

Under such new time and space circumstance, the “major consensus” of “integrating into-pulling in” is now inadequate to deal with actual situation or guide the future. In fact, the concepts of “peaceful development” “new pattern of relationship between great powers” raised by China and “responsible stakeholder” “strategic reassurance” proposed by the United States in the past more than 10 years were all new expressions of Sino-US relations put forward consciously or unconsciously under the background of the weakening of old “major consensus”. Therefore, not only the debate on Sino-US relations in the United States is inevitable, but also there should be serious and profound discussion in China over the future development path of the country and the development of Sino-US relations.

In the first 35 years, the Sino-US “major consensus” was established around the integration of China into the international system. While the loosening of this “major consensus” in recent years was due to the rapid rise of China after it finished its integration into the international community, the author argues that the new “major consensus” should be based on the existing “major consensus”-that is to say, the new “major consensus” should be built under the guideline of “two countries, one system”. The proposal of the new “major consensus” was because the author believed that for China, the only feasible path of development was peaceful development under the framework of the existing international system; at the same time, for the United States, due to the huge scale of China and the interdependence between America and China, if China isolates itself from the international system actively or passively, the United States will suffer a loss too painful to bear. If both countries agree that they have to realize co-existence and mutual development in the existing international system, then the establishment of the new “major consensus” is possible.

For China, the most important judgment is: are there any other feasible development paths rather than the development in the existing international system? China needs to make its own judgment on the nature of the existing international system: is it a system which can accommodate the peaceful rise or even “peaceful transcendence” of China? As China has achieved dramatic development during the past 35 years within this system, could it continue its development in the next 35 years, or will it finally be confronted with a “glass ceiling”? The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the economic stagnation of Japan since 1990 were mainly due to their domestic reasons or due to the nature of the international system and the conspiracy of the hegemony country in this system. These judgments will finally decide our fundamental strategic orientation to the existing international system and the United States.

If “rise within the existing system” remains the best choice for China, then although China didn’t participate in the establishment of many parts of this system and there are many unreasonable elements in this system, China still needs to behave according to rules within this system, make the most of the existing rules and the rights granted by this system to reform the system and accept the possible damage to its own specific interests caused by the general rules of the system.

For the United States, the most important strategic judgment is: what position it should take to China-a country with different ideology and will possibly surpass the United States in terms of economic scale. It should accept the rise of China within this system with an open mind as ever, or take the brand-new exclusive and competitive stance? Is it feasible to take the strategy of curbing or balancing China? Is it really in America’s interest? If the United States sincerely believes and accepts that other countries surpass it within this system with peaceful and legitimate means, then it should get rid of its obsession with the mentality of “never be the second” and accept the possibility of being “peacefully transcended”. In terms of security, it should give up its pursuit of absolute security and recognize the state of relative security. And in the aspect of ideology, it should limit its belief on the universal applicability of its values and institutions, and agree that they may only fit the United States and other countries should better explore the most suitable development paths and models by themselves.

After making clear their ideas and reaching domestic consensus respectively, both countries should prove to each other that they really accept the new “major consensus” with a series of tangible policies, thus making each other convinced of the sincerity of the other side. At present, the most important issue is that the United States should make China believe that it doesn’t have the conspiracies of destructing the political security of China or hindering the long-term sustainable development of Chinese economy, and is willing to grant China with reasonable space in international mechanisms (like the International Monetary Fund) and accept China to join in the new mechanisms (like the TPP) led by the United States. While China needs to make the United States believe that China is willing to achieve its development and resolve international contradictions under the framework of existing international rules, accept the participation of the United States in international mechanisms initiated by China and have no intention to force the United States out of Asia.

“Realize mutual development within the same international system” means that the two countries could carry out limited competition within the existing system. However, the competition should be non-comprehensive, with its bottom line and should not set the goal of “eating” each other. Both sides need to strengthen the confidence of the other side-none of them should worry that the other side will become the reason of the failure of its own. It also means that they should carry out effective cooperation-not only realize mutual benefit, but also play their leading role for the maintaining and reform of the system.

Before the end of the presidential election of the United States in the end of 2016, the debate on the diplomatic strategy to China in the United States will not be over. Even when the new government of the United States comes to power in 2017, both sides still need some running-in time. In fact, the outcome of the debate isn’t necessarily negative. Besides, even without this debate, questions with Sino-US relations were still there and need to be resolved. As the vessel of Sino-US relations has moved forward, we can no longer cease to advance and be content with the old “major consensus”. Not only people in the United States could debate, the Chinese strategic circle should also make discussions and at the same time dialogue with their American counterparts. By doing this, China and the United States are still expected to rebuild the “major consensus” and realize the stable development of Sino-US relations in the medium and long run.
　
(Da Wei, Director of Department for American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)