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Carr’s View on China


Ai Ping Who is Carr? His full name is Robert Carr, and he is now Dean of the Australia-China Relations Institute of the University of Technology Sydney. He served as the Australian Foreign Minister from March of 2012 to September of 2013. Before that, he was a professional politician, one of the main leaders of the Australian Labor Party and the longest-serving governor of New South Wales. Six years after he retired from the governorship, Prime Minister Julia Gillard invited him back to replace the then foreign minister Kevin Ludd. This was nothing short of a dream job especially after he thought he had already reached the peak of his political career. Although he was aware that his term would be 18 months only, he was fully devoted to a whirlwind of diplomatic duties and at the same time recorded these busy days and his experience in his diaries. In September of 2013, the Labor Party lost the election without a surprise, and Carr left his office. Before long, his book Diary of Foreign Minister was published. During my latest visit to Australia in last April as head of a CAFIU delegation, I visited his Institute, the only research institute on Australia-China relations in Australia. We had such an in-depth and candid exchange of views that had almost made us forget the time. In the evening, Carr had his new book with a few words written on the flyleaf sent to me, expressing his best wishes and good will for further cooperation. Diary of Foreign Minister, as the name indicates, is in chronological order with no chapters and has very little artificial embellishment. Due to my acquaintance with the author, I carefully read through the whole book. The most attractive part of it to me is his words on China. He wrote about his experiences when he accompanied Prime Minister Gillard to attend the Bo’ao Forum for Asia and visit China, as well as his own visit to China as foreign minister two months after taking office. It seemed that he would have visited China a bit earlier but he was talked down by his advisors who insisted that he should visit America first in order not to make a scene. As a matter of fact, “China” was always on his list of talking points during his visits to America. The same was with his visits to India, Japan, ROK, and ASEAN states etc. Carr didn’t only exchange views about China with his foreign counterparts, but also paid close attention to the view points of strategists, famous scholars and think tank experts. He recalled in vivid details the remarks made by his old friend Dr. Kissinger on China, and also wrote down his own understanding to China-related books by Edward Luttwak, Ralph Pezzullo and David Shambaugh. He took Singaporean Foreign Minister Shanmugam as his bosom friend and constantly exchanged ideas with the latter during his shuttle visits to the Asia Pacific region. This was also because he regarded Singapore as the world’s No.1 think tank on China issue. He was always proud of the fact that the Australian foreign service is more familiar with Asian-Pacific affairs than any of the other diplomatic corps to EU and he even quoted a telegraph written by his staff to support his point. The Diary includes many “inside stories” too, such as how the Australian Cabinet and National Security Committee discussed the draft of National Defense White Paper in 2009 and 2013, especially over the China part. The book also touches upon Carr’s presence at the United Nations, G20 and other multi-lateral occasions, as well as Australia’s relations with South Pacific island countries, Commonwealth countries, Caribbean countries and African countries, even domestic politics in Australia. With this being said, “China” is no doubt a top topic in the entire book. I think there are three reasons to explain this. Firstly, the revival of emerging countries including China is too important to be ignored in today’s world. Secondly, in dealing with changes in the contemporary world pattern, Australia has a unique geographical location and enjoys exceptional advantages. Thirdly, Mr. Carr, who has a special interest in “China policy”, took up the key position at the key moment and thus played an active role in “history making”. Let’s look at his links with China. Even before he became the foreign minister, he had involved in a “turmoil” about China. In 2011, President Obama visited Australia and delivered a speech at the Parliament. He announced America’s decision to station 2500 marines in Darwin and criticized “China’s system”. His remarks aroused strong concerns in Australia. In his blog, Mr. Carr cited remarks and concerns made by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul John Keating, as well as Australian business leaders and experts, saying that Obama’s decision is pushing China away. What Carr did consisted part of a larger and wider debate involving almost all Asian Pacific countries about how to deal with the landmark event of the century——“China’s rejuvenation”. After taking office as the foreign minister, Carr was very keen to keeping a “healthier Australia-China relationship”. He may not have the authority to change the bedrock of Australian foreign relations, i.e. the Australia-U.S. alliance. However, he did his best in the 18 months to somewhat reverse what he thought a “too much distancing from” China by Australia, so as to avoid tensions or even conflicts between the two countries. This was actually a very mainstream position in Australia. He quoted China Daily’s comments in his diary that Australia would become the friendliest western country toward China. Unsurprisingly, there were naysayers against Carr’s China complex. Right after he published his blogs, some American senior officials in charge of national security and foreign affairs such as Thomas Donilon and Kurt Campbell warned of fixing him. So Carr became cautious after he took office and in return, the American side toned down harsh criticism during his visit to the United States. Hillary Clinton only simply mentioned that some Australian media regarded American marine’s presence in Australia as being “anti-China”, which was in fact not the case and she herself was just about to visit China for a “strategic dialogue”. Some Australian and foreign scholars shrugged off Carr’s “China complex”. Both Paul Monk and Edward Luttwak bashed China for being “self-centered”, not good at “treating others as equal” and being “clumsy at international strategy”. There were also people who tried to drive a wedge in-between, saying that the Chinese think Canada is more important than Australia. Of course, Carr didn’t buy it. In his term, Carr took many concrete measures to maintain the soundness of Australia-China relations. When the Australian Cabinet discussed the plan for Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation (AUSMIN), the Ministry of Defense called for responding to Obama’s proposal made during his visit in November 2011. But Carr suggested a “second thought”. Then he spoke at length with Defense Minister Stephen Smith and spared no efforts in communicating with various sides. Finally, it was decided that Carr would be the first speaker at the press conference to set the basic tune that there was no intention to contain China. He also participated in the discussion concerning the 2013 National Defense White Paper, which was totally different from the 2009 version. The new White Paper stated that the Australian Government no longer takes China as rivalry, there is nothing stunning for China to turn its economic strength into military power, and the U.S.-China relations will decide Australia’s strategic environment in the coming decades. On most part, people welcomed Carr’s efforts. However, there were also critical voices. The most acute one came from Richard Lee Armitage, a famous hawkish figure on China policy. When receiving an interview by Australian press, Armitage quoted Carr’s words without mentioning his name and said that he was deeply disappointed that Australia pinned its national security on America’s maximum cooperation and minimum competition with China. He indicated that due to China’s position on the South China sea and East China sea, “use of force” is not off the table and military conflicts are “very possible” in Asia in 15 to 30 years. Such rhetoric was not new. As early as around 2000, Armitage had already alleged that war between America and China over the Taiwan issue was highly possible and asked Australia to choose side. What was more astonishing for Carr was what Luttwak said in his book The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy that Australia is the first country talking about containing China’s rise, and it has taken the initiative to form an alliance and manage it according to requirements of strategic logic. His argument was based on the 2009 National Defense White Paper and Australia’s close relations with Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam. Then why did the 2009 National Defense White Paper has words like that? Carr went to ask Mr. Mike Pezzullo, former Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, who participated in the drafting of the 2009 National Defense White Paper. Pezzullo told him the ins and outs of Australia’s China policy. There were three key policy options for Australia in face with China’s rise: contain, bet hedging and super hedge. The 2009 National Defense White Paper was an example of overdoing in “super hedge”. It exaggerated China’s “aggressive” strategic positioning, the prospect of major conflicts and promises of practical response such as purchasing 12 submarines and new fighters etc. For Carr however, the China-U.S. relations are the most important bilateral relationship in the world, not just for Australia, but for the whole world as well. Like many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, what Australia wants most is a good relationship kept between the two countries. If something goes wrong in this relationship, it would be a nightmare for Australia, Singapore and even the entire region. Carr’s Singaporean friend was of the view that Singapore and Australia should help China understand the U.S. so as to avoid any misunderstanding and misjudgment. Many people including Carr appreciated Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s view that peace and security in the Asia-Pacific depends on whether China becomes an isolated and chauvinist force that holds grudge against the West as a result of the West trying to delay or abort its development, or becomes more intelligent, visionary, internationalized and open through wide participation in the world affairs. In conclusion, through this Diary, we could better understand how Carr perceived and promoted the Australia-China relations during his foreign ministerial term. In addition, by reading his activities and presence on the international stage, we could also get to know many of his “colleagues”—foreign ministers of other countries and members of the Australian Cabinet—and see how they view and think about China’s renewal.